The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five Takes on Wynne and Direct Marketing Association by Denning, Brannon P.
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes 
2016 
The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five 
Takes on Wynne and Direct Marketing Association 
Brannon P. Denning 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/headnotes 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Denning, Brannon P., "The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five Takes on Wynne and 
Direct Marketing Association" (2016). Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes. 42. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/headnotes/42 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes collection by an authorized administrator of the 




THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
WYNNES WON WINS ONE: 
FIVE TAKES ON WYNNE AND DIRECT 
MARKETING ASSOCIATION 
Brannon P. Denning† 
  INTRODUCTION   
October Term 2014 featured what is to date the most im-
portant state and local tax case since 1992‘s Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota.1 In Comptroller v. Wynne,2 the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed a state court decision holding unconstitutional 
Maryland‘s refusal to grant a credit for taxes paid by a resident 
taxpayer to other states on income earned by the taxpayer in 
those states. The scope of the decision remains something of a 
mystery, as does the Court‘s decision to grant certiorari in the 
first place. After a brief summary of the case, I will offer five 
takes on Wynne and another state and local tax case from the 
2014-2015 term, Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl.3  
First, it is somewhat remarkable that, having agreed to 
hear the case, the Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals instead of reversing it. For the first time in many years, 
then, the Supreme Court found a state tax to violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD). Second, in strik-
ing down the Maryland tax, the Court relied in part on the ―in-
ternal consistency‖ doctrine, an aspect of fair apportionment 
whose continued viability one prominent state and local tax 
 
†  Associate Dean and Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford 
University. This is a revised and extended version of remarks made at The 
University of Minnesota Law School Corporate Institute Forum on Taxation 
and Regulation‘s Perspectives on Taxation Lecture Series on November 17, 
2015. Thanks to Kristin Hickman for the kind invitation and to Joel Michael 
for moderating. Sarah F. Bothma provided excellent research assistance. 
Thanks to Bruce Ely, Mike Kent, and Norman Williams for comments on an 
earlier version of this Essay. Copyright © 2016 by Brannon P. Denning.  
1. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 3. 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). 
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scholar questioned just a few years ago. Third, the Court‘s in-
vocation of internal consistency and the linkage of it with the 
DCCD‘s anti-discrimination principle—a linkage at odds with 
the generally-understood framework the Court laid down near-
ly forty years ago in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady4—
raises the possibility that the Court‘s DCCD jurisprudence in 
tax cases might be undergoing a transformation. Fourth, addi-
tional evidence that doctrinal change is afoot is furnished by 
Justice Kennedy‘s concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Asso-
ciation. In it, Kennedy signaled a willingness to reconsider 
Quill‘s holding that the Commerce Clause requires the taxpay-
er‘s physical presence in a state to trigger an obligation to col-
lect and remit sales and use taxes.5 Kennedy was part of the 
Quill majority,6 so his concurrence increases the likelihood the 
Court may reconsider Quill in the near future. Fifth, and final-
ly, a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari to, vacate, and remand the decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in First Marblehead Corporation v. 
Commissioner,7 offers some hints at the potential scope of 
Wynne. A brief conclusion follows. 
  COMPTROLLER V. WYNNE: A SUMMARY8   
Maryland imposed both a state and a county income tax on 
the personal income of its residents.9 While the state provided a 
credit for taxes paid in other jurisdictions against the state tax, 
it did not provide a similar credit against the county tax.10 The 
Wynnes argued that the lack of credit meant that their income 
would be subject to double taxation.11 When the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the deficiency, the Maryland Tax Court affirmed the 
 
 4. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 5. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 6. Justice Kennedy joined the concurring opinion written by Justice Scal-
ia. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (1992) (Scalia, J., con-
curring). 
 7. First Marblehead Corp. v. Comm‘r, 23 N.E.3d 892 (Mass. 2015), cert. 
granted, vacated, and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 317 (2015). 
 8. This summary draws on BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE 
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE (2d ed. 2013 & 2016 
Supp.). 
 9. Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1792 (2015). 
 10. Id. at 1793. 
 11. Id. The Wynnes owned stock in a Subchapter S corporation that filed 
tax returns in thirty-nine states. The income of the corporation passed 
through to the taxpayers, who were likewise allocated a pro rata share of taxes 
paid to the various states. See id. 
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Comptroller‘s assessment. The circuit court, however, reversed, 
concluding that Maryland‘s tax scheme violated the DCCD.12 
The state appealed, and the Maryland Court of Appeals af-
firmed the circuit court‘s decision.13 The Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari and—to the surprise of many—affirmed.14  
Justice Alito‘s opinion for the Court stated that the ―exist-
ing dormant Commerce Clause cases all but dictate the result 
reached in th[e] case by Maryland‘s highest court.‖15 In three 
separate cases, he noted, ―the Court struck down a state tax 
scheme that might have resulted in the double taxation of in-
come earned out of the State and that discriminated in favor of 
intrastate over interstate economic activity.‖16  
In addition to the cases cited, the Court concluded that the 
lack of a credit violated the Court‘s ―internal consistency‖ 
test.17 In order to pass constitutional muster under the Com-
merce Clause, (1) a state or local government seeking to tax in-
terstate commerce must have a substantial nexus with the tax-
payer; (2) the tax must be fairly apportioned; (3) 
nondiscriminatory; and (4) the amount of the tax must be fairly 
related to the services provided by the state.18 A part of the fair 
apportionment inquiry, the internal consistency test requires a 
reviewing court to perform the following thought experiment: 
imagine that every other state has the same taxing regime as 
the one under review. If identical application of the tax could 
result in double taxation, then the tax fails internal consisten-
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)). 
The Complete Auto test ―asks whether a ‗tax is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services 
provided by the State.‘‖ Id. The Court of Appeals held that the tax failed the 
apportionment and discrimination prongs of the test. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1794, 1807. For a pessimistic assessment of the Wynnes‘ chanc-
es prior to the decision, see Brannon P. Denning & Norman R. Williams, 
Wynne: Lose or Draw?, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 245 (2014). 
 15. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794. The cases, which are rather elderly, were 
J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (striking down unap-
portioned gross receipts tax imposed on domestic corporation that exposed ―in-
terstate commerce … to the risk of double taxation‖); Gwin, White & Prince, 
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939) (invalidating unapportioned ―busi-
ness activities‖ tax laid on gross receipts of domestic corporation); and Central 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948) (invalidating unappor-
tioned gross receipts tax laid on interstate bus company). 
 16. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795. 
 17. Id. at 1803. 
 18. See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 277–79.  
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cy.19 Guarding against double taxation ensures that interstate 
commerce is not placed at a disadvantage relative to intrastate 
commerce. Justice Alito agreed with the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland that  
Maryland‘s income tax scheme fails the internal consistency test. A 
simple example illustrates the point. Assume that every State im-
posed the following taxes, which are similar to Maryland‘s ―county‖ 
and ―special nonresident‖ taxes: (1) a 1.25% tax on income that resi-
dents earn in State, (2) a 1.25% tax on income that residents earn in 
other jurisdictions, and (3) a 1.25% tax on income that nonresidents 
earn in State. Assume further that two taxpayers, April and Bob, 
both live in State A, but that April earns her income in State A 
whereas Bob earns his income in State B. In this circumstance, Bob 
will pay more income tax than April solely because he earns income 
interstate. Specifically, April will have to pay a 1.25% tax only once, 
to State A. But Bob will have to pay a 1.25% tax twice: once to State 
A, where he resides, and once to State B, where he earns the in-
come.20 
The Court noted that a credit against the county tax would 
have cured the double-taxation problem, but it declined to ―es-
tablish [a] rule of priority‖ requiring ―a State taxing based on 
residence to ‗recede‘ to a State taxing based on source.‖21 The 
majority further noted that its decision was not intended to 
―foreclose the possibility that [Maryland] could comply with the 
Commerce Clause in some other way.‖22 
The Court rejected a number of arguments put forward to 
save the tax: that the earlier cases involved gross receipts taxes 
as opposed to income taxes,23 for example, or that they involved 
 
 19. Oklahoma Tax Comm‘n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 
(1995); see also Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections 
on an Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 TAX L. REV. 
1 (2007) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Dead]; Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Con-
sistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on 
State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1988) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Foolish]. 
 20. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803–04 (citations omitted). 
 21. Id. at 1805. 
 22. Id. at 1806. Justice Alito noted that  
[w]henever government impermissibly treats like cases differently, it 
can cure the violation by either ―leveling up‖ or ―leveling down.‖ 
Whenever a State impermissibly taxes interstate commerce at a high-
er rate than intrastate commerce, that infirmity could be cured by 
lowering the higher rate, raising the lower rate, or a combination of 
the two. 
Id. As Edward Zelinsky notes, another remedy would be to exempt nondomicil-
iary income from taxation. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Enigma of Wynne, 7 WM. 
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 797, 811–14 (2016). 
 23. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1796 (―The discarded distinction between taxes 
on gross receipts and net income was based on the notion, endorsed in some 
early cases, that a tax on gross receipts is an impermissible ‗direct and imme-
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corporations, not individuals.24 As to the first, Justice Alito 
wrote that ―[w]e see no reason why the distinction between 
gross receipts and net income should matter, particularly in 
light of the admonition that we must consider ‗not the formal 
language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect.‘‖25 
Moreover, the Court continued, ―it is hard to see why the 
dormant Commerce Clause should treat individuals less favor-
ably than corporations.‖26 Though individuals enjoy benefits 
and services the state provides, corporations do too, he ob-
served.27 
The Court also rejected as ―fanciful‖ the argument that the 
political safeguards provided through the franchise warranted 
the Court‘s acquiescence to Maryland‘s tax scheme because a 
majority of residents might find it expedient to tax their fellow 
residents‘ out of state income.28 Wynne reemphasized that the 
Due Process and Commerce Clauses protect different interests 
and that simply because the taxing scheme might pass muster 
under the former does not automatically mean it survives re-
view under the latter.29 
Justice Ginsburg wrote the main dissent,30 which empha-
sized the principle—articulated in numerous Due Process 
Clause cases—that a state may tax the entire income of its res-
idents.31 She noted that ―[r]esidents . . . possess political means, 
not shared by outsiders, to ensure that the power to tax their 
 
diate burden‘ on interstate commerce, whereas a tax on net income is merely 
an ‗indirect and incidental‘ burden. . . . [T]he direct-indirect burdens test was 
replaced with a more practical approach that looked to the economic impact of 
the tax. These cases worked ‗a substantial judicial reinterpretation of the pow-
er of the States to levy taxes on gross income from interstate commerce.‘‖) 
(quoting United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 328–29 
(1918); 2 TROST & HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL 
TAXATION § 10:1, p.251 (2d ed. 2003)) (citations omitted). 
 24. Id. at 1797. 
 25. Id. at 1795. 
 26. Id. at 1797. 
 27. Id. (noting that ―corporations also benefit heavily from state and local 
services‖). 
 28. Id. at 1798 (―[T]he notion that the vicitims of . . . discrimination have 
a complete remedy at the polls is fanciful. It is likely that only a distinct mi-
nority of a State‘s residents earns income out of the State.‖). 
 29. Id. at 1799. 
 30. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, each reiterating his own oppo-
sition to the totality of the DCCD. See Id. at 1807 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 
1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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income is not abused.‖32 Moreover, she argued, ―nothing in the 
Constitution or in prior decisions of this Court dictates that one 
of two States . . . must recede simply because both have lawful 
tax regimes reaching the same income.‖33 She asserted that, ―at 
bottom,‖ Wynne was about policy choices: ―Should States priori-
tize ensuring that all who live and work within the State 
should pay their fair share of the costs of government? Or must 
States prioritize avoidance of double taxation?‖34 Resolving 
those concerns was beyond the competence of the Court and 
should, she argued, be left to state legislatures or to Congress.35 
  TAKE ONE: A RARE WIN FOR THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE   
My first point may seem obvious, but it nevertheless bears 
mentioning: Wynne saw the Court, for the first time in a dec-
ade, hold that a state law violated the DCCD. The doctrine has 
not had a good run of late in the Supreme Court. The last time 
a non-tax regulation was invalidated was in the 2005 
Granholm case, which involved the direct shipment of wine.36 
The last DCCD victory in a tax case—nearly twenty years 
ago—was Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board,37 in which 
the Court held unconstitutional California‘s refusal to allow in-
terest expense to be claimed by a nondomiciliary corporate tax-
payer.38 The appellees‘ victory alone, after such a losing streak 
for the DCCD, makes Wynne an important decision. 
The DCCD has had a particularly rough go of it in the Rob-
erts Court era. Before Justice Scalia‘s death, any DCCD claim 
automatically began with a 0-2 count, because of Justice 
Thomas‘s announced refusal to enforce it39 and Justice Scalia‘s 
 
 32. Id. at 1814. 
 33. Id. at 1813. 
 34. Id. at 1823. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (striking down Michigan 
law permitting in-state but not out-of-state wineries to ship directly to con-
sumers). 
 37. 528 U.S. 458 (2000). 
 38. See id. at 468. 
 39. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609–20 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (―That the expansion effected by today's deci-
sion finds some support in the morass of our negative Commerce Clause case 
law only serves to highlight the need to abandon that failed jurisprudence and 
to consider restoring the original Import-Export Clause check on discriminato-
ry state taxation to what appears to be its proper role.‖). 
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substantially equivalent position.40 Chief Justice Roberts, 
though joining the Wynne majority, created an additional ex-
ception to the DCCD in 2007.41 Justice Ginsburg is often skep-
tical, as her dissent indicates; she was joined by Justice Kagan 
as well as by Justice Scalia.42 Only Justices Kennedy and Alito 
are consistent supporters of the DCCD.43 Therefore, the news 
that the Court had granted certiorari in Wynne was greeted 
with trepidation among supporters of the DCCD;44 the Court 
does not often grant certiorari simply to affirm lower court 
holdings.45 
It seems likely that there were four votes to hear Wynne 
and then one of the Justices whose mind was not made up was 
persuaded to be the fifth in a majority to uphold. One clue is 
the somewhat peculiar structure of the opinion. While Justice 
Alito held that Maryland‘s failure to offer the tax credit to the 
Wynnes failed the internal consistency test, the majority opin-
ion also held that the result followed a fortiori from the three 
rather old cases invalidating unapportioned corporate gross re-
ceipts taxes. Reliance on those cases might have been one 
member of the Court‘s price for making (or keeping) a majority. 
That member may have preferred to rest the holding on narrow 
stare decisis grounds, rather than on the more sweeping inter-
nal consistency rationale. (On the other hand, no member of the 
majority concurred separately to disclaim reliance on the inter-
nal consistency portion of the opinion.) 
It is nevertheless worrisome that Justice Ginsburg was a 
single vote away from essentially gutting the fair apportion-
ment prong of Complete Auto. The DCCD has long protected 
 
 40. Technically, Justice Scalia‘s position was not so uncompromising; he 
maintained that he would adhere to prior cases as a matter of stare decisis, 
but only if the factual situations were identical. See id. at 635. 
 41. United Haulers Ass‘n , Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 340–41 (2007) (holding that an ordinance that favors pub-
lic entities does not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of 
the DCCD). 
 42. See Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1813 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 43. See, e.g., Dep‘t of Rev. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 362 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 44. See, e.g., Denning & Williams, supra note 14, at 264–65. 
 45. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Rever-
sal Rate, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 25, 2007), http://concurringopinions 
.com/archives/2007/07/some_thoughts_o.html (noting that statistics show the 
Court reverses in around 75% of cases it hears, concluding ―that the Supreme 
Court primarily takes cases it wants to reverse, with only a few exceptions‖). 
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the income earned in interstate commerce from double taxa-
tion. To hold, as Justice Ginsburg urged, that the domiciliary 
states could tax 100% of their residents‘ income with no credit 
for taxes paid in other jurisdictions would have removed that 
important constitutional safeguard and left out-of-state income 
vulnerable. Disabling that safeguard would likewise endanger 
the anti-discrimination principle because it would clearly ad-
vantage intrastate income over that earned elsewhere.46 
  TAKE TWO: INTERNAL CONSISTENCY LIVES!   
While the Court had long considered unapportioned state 
and local taxes of businesses that earned income in many dif-
ferent jurisdictions to be a constitutional problem,47 in the 
1980s it subdivided Complete Auto‘s fair apportionment prong 
into requirements that taxes be ―internally‖ and ―externally‖ 
consistent.48 The latter looks ―to the economic justification for 
the State‘s claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a 
State‘s tax reaches beyond the portion of value that is fairly at-
tributable to economic activity within the taxing State.‖49 In 
other words, external consistency ―is nothing more than anoth-
er label for the fair apportionment requirement.‖50 
Internal consistency, however, provides additional protec-
tion against the possibility of double taxation by requiring 
courts to perform a thought experiment. For each tax, a court 
must assume that every other state imposes an identical tax to 
see ―whether its identical application by every State in the Un-
ion would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as com-
pared with commerce intrastate.‖51 
In 1988, Professor Walter Hellerstein undertook a critical 
 
 46. I argue below that fair apportionment and anti-discrimination re-
quirements of Complete Auto seem to be converging. See infra notes 67–85 and 
accompanying text. 
 47. DENNING, supra note 8, at § 8.11, 8-43 (―The danger of multiple tax 
burdens has been recognized for well over a century; indeed, the courts have 
employed it more persistently, with fewer detours, dead ends, and qualifica-
tions than any other principle in determining whether a state tax violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause.‖). 
 48. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 
(1983). 
 49. Oklahoma Tax Comm‘n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 
(1995). 
 50. 1 JEROME HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 4.16[2], at 4-244 
(3d ed. 1998). 
 51. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185. 
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analysis of this new doctrine.52 He concluded that while there 
was nothing novel about the Court ensuring that ―interstate 
business should not be subject to additional tax burdens merely 
because it engages in commercial activity across state lines,‖53 
he argued that the results achieved by applying the internal 
consistency test could have been achieved ―under a straight-
forward application of the venerable fair apportionment re-
quirement.‖54 He worried that the introduction of the concept 
simply ―introduce[d] confusion and uncertainty in an area of 
the law that has had more than its fair share of both.‖55 
Nearly two decades later, however, the Court decided 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Ser-
vice Commission (American Trucking II),56 in which the Court 
upheld an unapportioned tax on intrastate commercial haul-
ers.57 The Court distinguished American Trucking Associations, 
Inc. v. Scheiner (American Trucking I),58 in which the Court 
held that an unapportioned flat fee on commercial haulers 
failed the internal consistency test, because unlike the flat fee 
in American Trucking I, the Michigan tax applied solely to in-
trastate commerce.59 
Following American Trucking II, Professor Hellerstein 
wrote a sequel of sorts to his earlier article asking whether in-
ternal consistency was now dead.60 ―In effect,‖ he wrote, ―the 
Court looked the implications of the internal consistency doc-
trine squarely in the eye and blinked.‖61 Reconsidering pre-
American Trucking II case law in light of the decision and then 
looking at post-American Trucking II decisions in state courts, 
Professor Hellerstein concluded: 
We now know from American Trucking II that the most expansive in-
terpretations of the internal consistency doctrine cannot be sustained, 
 
 52. See Hellerstein, Foolish, supra note 19. 
 53. Id. at 188. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 545 U.S. 429 (2005). 
 57. Id. at 438. 
 58. 483 U.S. 266 (1987). 
 59. American Trucking II, 545 U.S. at 436–37 (contrasting the Pennsyl-
vania axle tax ―levied upon all trucks (interstate and intrastate) that used its 
roads, including trucks that merely crossed Pennsylvania‘s borders to 
transport, say, Ohio goods to New Jersey customers‖ with the Michigan fee, 
which ―taxe[d] purely local activity‖ and ―does not tax an interstate truck‘s en-
try into the State nor . . . transactions spanning multiple States‖). 
 60. See Hellerstein, Dead, supra note 19. 
 61. Id. at 26. 
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at least when the exactions at issue can fairly be characterized as ―lo-
cal fees that are uniformly assessed upon all those who engage in lo-
cal business, interstate and domestic firms alike.‖ Thus the Court‘s 
opinion in American Trucking II may well insulate from successful 
constitutional challenge a number of fees and taxes that once ap-
peared vulnerable to attack under the internal consistency principle. 
Among these are (1) the initial fees and taxes that states impose on 
domestic corporations when first organizing or qualifying to do busi-
ness in the state, (2) the annual business license taxes imposed by 
states and localities for carrying on particular trades or occupations, 
many of which are unapportioned, (3) professional and similar licens-
ing fees, and, of course, (4) flat taxes on trucks. Although the hypo-
thetical replication of these fees and taxes by every state or locality 
imposes a cumulative tax burden on the multistate enterprise not 
borne by its intrastate competitor solely because the multistate busi-
ness has chosen to do business in more than one state, they also ap-
pear to fall under the umbrella of American Trucking II‘s exception. 
In fact, the Court explicitly identified as presumptively unobjectiona-
ble the ―numerous flat fees upon local businesses and service provid-
ers, including, for example, upon insurers, auctioneers, ambulance 
operators, and hosts of others.‖62 
Not only did Wynne not kill off internal consistency, the 
case might conceivably be read to make it the focus of the 
Court‘s efforts to combat unconstitutional double taxation and 
tax discrimination. In his commentary on Wynne, Professor 
Hellerstein observed that the case could be read to hold ―that 
internal consistency is the only principle (apart from extraterri-
torial taxation or ‗external consistency‘) for determining wheth-
er a tax imposes an unconstitutional risk of cumulative tax 
burdens in violation of the Commerce Clause.‖63 For him, how-
ever, that reading would be an unfortunate one.  
Previously, he argued, when faced with a conflict between 
a state‘s claim on an apportioned slice and a second state‘s 
claim on the entire pie, ―the Court generally resolved those con-
flicts, without resort to the internal consistency principle,‖ by 
requiring the latter to yield to the former‘s claim.64 If Wynne 
makes internal inconsistency the ―sine qua non of a [multiple 
taxation] claim,‖ he concluded, then the case ―made a notewor-
thy modification in dormant Commerce Clause law.‖65 For Pro-
fessor Hellerstein, however, internal consistency should be a 
sufficient, but not a necessary condition for invalidating a state 
or local tax under the fair apportionment prong of Complete Au-
 
 62. Id. at 50–51 (footnotes omitted). 
 63. Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Court’s Opinion in 
Wynne, 123 J. TAX‘N 4, 10 (2015). 
 64. Id. at 12. 
 65. Id. at 10, 12. 
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to. Even so, he argued that any possible weakening of scrutiny 
for ―internally consistent taxes that create the risk of multiple 
taxation‖ might have been offset by Wynne‘s ―reject[ion of] dis-
tinctions . . . between gross receipts taxes and net income taxes 
and between corporations and individuals.‖66 
  TAKE THREE: IS WYNNE A HARBINGER OF DOCTRINAL 
CHANGE IN STATE AND LOCAL TAX CASES?   
One interesting—if curious—aspect of the Wynne opinion is 
its treatment of internal consistency as an aspect of the rule 
against anti-discrimination and not as one half of the inquiry 
into fair apportionment. Another is the absence of the Complete 
Auto test. Both, along with Justice Kennedy‘s expression of se-
cond thoughts about his vote in Quill equating ―substantial 
nexus‖ with physical presence,67 suggest that the Court‘s appli-
cation of the DCCD to state and local taxes is evolving. 
Introducing the section discussing internal consistency, 
Justice Alito writes that the test functions to help ―courts iden-
tify tax schemes that discriminate against interstate com-
merce.‖68 Applying the internal consistency test to the Mary-
land tax, Justice Alito concludes that ―Maryland‘s tax scheme is 
inherently discriminatory and operates as a tariff.‖69 Comment-
ing on this portion of Alito‘s opinion, Professor Edward Zel-
insky asked: 
[i]s Wynne now suggesting that discrimination and apportionment are 
the same dormant Commerce Clause inquiries? If so, that would be a 
radical transformation of the Complete Auto formula that treats ap-
portionment and discrimination as independent, separate hurdles, 
both of which must be surmounted for a tax to survive dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. If not, it is perplexing that the Wynne 
Court, by deploying the internal consistency test, struck the creditless 
Maryland county income tax as malapportioned without explicitly 
saying so.70 
In addition to its collapse of at least part of the fair appor-
tionment test into the anti-discrimination principle, the Court 
did not test the tax for external consistency. Like Professor Hel-
 
 66. Id. at 21. 
 67. See infra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. 
 68. Comptroller v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1802 (2015). 
 69. Id. at 1804. The Court was influenced by a brief written by academics 
Michael Knoll and Ruth Mason, who had previously outlined their thinking in 
a series of law review articles. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason, 
How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Should Apply Wynne, 78 ST. 
TAX NOTES 921 (2015). 
 70. Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 812. 
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lerstein, Professor Zelinsky noted the Court‘s ―enigmatic si-
lence‖71 on external consistency, and wondered whether inter-
nal consistency would not henceforth be the alpha and omega of 
fair apportionment. If so, he thought that would represent ―a 
dramatic reduction of scrutiny under the dormant Commerce 
Clause as internal consistency is to be the end of the inquiry, 
which previously continued to the practical test of external con-
sistency.‖72 
Equally curious is Wynne‘s failure to mention Complete Au-
to, much less analyze the case using Complete Auto‘s four-factor 
framework.73 These oddities, plus Justice Kennedy‘s abjuration 
of his vote in Quill,74 strongly suggest instability in the doc-
trine.75 Is it possible that the Court is on the verge of replacing 
Complete Auto‘s four-factor test? If so, what would the new doc-
trine look like? 
The majority rejected one option, urged by the dissent, the 
State of Maryland, and the U.S. Government: invalidate only 
facially discriminatory state and local taxes, trusting that the 
political process and the Due Process Clause will function to 
prevent egregious abuses.76 And yet, the Court no longer seems 
satisfied with the Complete Auto framework either. 
The collapse of internal consistency and the anti-
 
 71. See id. at 808. 
 72. Id. at 810. 
 73. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793–94 (discussing Complete Auto only when 
describing the Maryland Court of Appeals‘s application of its factors). There is 
one other absence in the opinion, though it is a welcomed one. When the Court 
upheld Kentucky‘s practice of exempting from its income tax the income gen-
erated from state-issued bonds, it applied the Pike balancing test, something 
that had never been a part of the Court‘s DCCD tax jurisprudence. See Dept. 
Rev. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353–56 (2008) (applying Pike balancing). For a 
discussion of the appearance of balancing in Davis, see Norman R. Williams & 
Brannon P. Denning, The “New Protectionism” and the American Common 
Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 304–09 (2009). Thanks to Norman Wil-
liams for noting Pike‘s absence in Wynne. 
 74. See infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 75. For some speculation why constitutional doctrine undergoes these pe-
riodic changes, see, for example, Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., 
Judicial Doctrine as Risk Regulation, 82 TENN. L. REV. 405, 428–38 (2015) 
(suggesting that doctrine undergoes change in response to judicial perceptions 
of risk to constitutional principles implemented by the doctrine); see also Ker-
mit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the 
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005) (identifying pathologies in constitu-
tional decisions that suggest doctrine is no longer functioning well to imple-
ment the principles it was designed to implement). 
 76. For Maryland and the U.S. Government‘s arguments, see Denning & 
Williams, supra note 14, at 252–64.  
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discrimination principle, as well as the abandonment of both 
the ―fairly related‖ factor77 and the physical presence require-
ment for substantial nexus, would roughly approximate the 
Court‘s doctrinal journey in non-tax cases. The black-letter law 
of the DCCD in non-tax cases states that laws discriminating 
against interstate commerce on their face, in their purposes, or 
in their effects, garner a kind of strict scrutiny, requiring the 
state to demonstrate (1) a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) 
end and (2) no less discriminatory means to effectuate that 
end.78 Truly nondiscriminatory laws that nevertheless burden 
interstate commerce are subject to the eponymous Pike balanc-
ing test, which requires challenges to demonstrate that the 
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the putative lo-
cal benefits.79 In practice, it has been over thirty years since the 
Supreme Court has invalidated a nondiscriminatory state or 
local law because it was unduly burdensome on interstate 
commerce.80 Moreover, the Court has likewise greatly limited—
perhaps to the point of abandoning—a branch of the DCCD 
that invalidated state laws having extraterritorial regulatory 
effects.81 These developments mean that—in the Supreme 
Court, at least—only a discriminatory state or local law will be 
deemed to run afoul of the DCCD.82  
In light of the Court‘s non-tax DCCD cases, the fair appor-
tionment requirement makes eminent sense as one iteration of 
the anti-discrimination principle. In much the same way that 
discrimination can lurk in the purposes or effects of a facially 
neutral statute in non-tax DCCD cases, internal consistency al-
lows a court, through a thought experiment, to see if the effect 
of a tax regime is such that, if duplicated, it would disad-
vantage interstate commerce relative to purely intrastate 
 
 77. The fairly related prong has never done much appreciable work. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625–26 (1981) (re-
fusing to invalidate severance tax on the grounds that taxpayers did not re-
ceive sufficient benefits from the state to justify imposition of the tax). 
 78. See, e.g., DENNING, supra note 8, § 6.06[A](3), at 6-56.  
 79. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 80. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). 
 81. For the origins and evolution of DCCD extraterritoriality, and an ar-
gument that the Court has largely abandoned it, see Brannon P. Denning, Ex-
traterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 
73 LA. L. REV. 979 (2013). 
 82. Discrimination is a necessary, but not always a sufficient condition for 
invalidation. Witness the Roberts Court‘s creation of the ―public entity‖ excep-
tion to the anti-discrimination principle. See supra note 41 and accompanying 
text. 
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commerce.83 If, as a Commerce Clause matter, fair apportion-
ment is not meant to safeguard against interstate commerce be-
ing treated worse than intrastate commerce, it is difficult to see 
why it is even a Commerce Clause concern. The Due Process 
Clause, with its dual concerns of notice and fairness, can ade-
quately safeguard against the extraterritorial exercise of taxing 
jurisdiction.84 
If placing anti-discrimination front and center in tax cases 
is indeed the Court‘s aim, it represents a fascinating conver-
gence of doctrinal lines governing tax and non-tax cases that 
diverged long ago. To make discrimination against interstate 
and foreign commerce the focus of the DCCD makes a good deal 
of sense and is likely more true to the reasons for restraining 
state taxing and regulatory power in that area in the first 
place.85 
 
 83. Knoll & Mason, supra note 69, at 923. Knoll and Mason, for example, 
explain that the Maryland statute in Wynne was internally inconsistent and, 
therefore, violated the DCCD. ―[A]s interpreted by the Supreme Court, the 
dormant commerce clause does not prevent double taxation as such, but rather 
it prevents discrimination against interstate commerce,‖ and ―avoiding dis-
crimination requires that state taxes be uniform.‖ Id. Internal consistency, 
they state, ―is an easy way to check for uniformity in a state‘s tax rates.‖ Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) 
(discussing the requirement that a tax be fairly apportioned to reflect the 
business conducted in the State); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 
447 U.S. 207 (1980) (discussing that the fair apportionment factor requires a 
rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the in-
trastate values of the enterprise); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 
(1978) (discussing that a single-factor formula that does not result in extrater-
ritorial taxation does not constitute a tax on income derived from sales also 
taxed by another state). 
 85. Professor Zelinsky argues that to make anti-discrimination the cen-
terpiece of the DCCD would be to move in precisely the wrong direction. Ac-
cording to Zelinsky, anti-discrimination is ―incoherent‖ because it is ―arbi-
trar[y]‖ and that things like lowering tax rates to encourage companies to 
relocate from State A to State B could be at risk. Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 
805, 808. ―[I]f some tax provisions that encourage in-state investment are 
deemed to be unconstitutionally discriminatory because of their tariff-like ef-
fects,‖ he argues, ―so too all economically equivalent direct expenditure pro-
grams must also run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause because of their 
identical, tariff-like effects.‖ Id. at 807. He claims that the Court‘s analogy of 
Maryland‘s tax to a tariff ―has no convincing limiting priniciple.‖ Id. Professor 
Zelinksy has long held the opinion that the Court should jettison the anti-
discrimination principle in DCCD cases. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Incoher-
ence of Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Profes-
sor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J. 653 (2007); Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics 
to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29 
(2002). For a response, see Brannon P. Denning, Is the Dormant Commerce 
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  TAKE FOUR: ARE QUILL‘S DAYS NUMBERED?   
Supporting the speculation above that the Court may be 
contemplating replacing Complete Auto‘s four-factor framework 
with something else is Justice Kennedy‘s concurring opinion in 
the 2014 October Term‘s other important state and local taxa-
tion case, Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl.86 In his sepa-
rate opinion, Justice Kennedy recanted his vote in Quill to re-
quire the physical presence of a retailer in a state in order to 
obligate the retailer to collect and remit sales and use taxes.87 
Since the Court announced it, Quill‘s holding has been con-
troversial.88 The advent of the Internet and the rise of electron-
ic commerce intensified the criticism.89 The Quill Court was ra-
 
Clause Expendable? A Response to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623 (2007); 
see also Edward A. Zelinsky & Brannon P. Denning, Debate, The Future of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause: Abolishing the Prohibition on Discriminatory 
Taxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 196 (2007).  
 86. 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). 
 87. See id. at 1134 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 88. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 327–28 (1992) (White, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court‘s retention of the physical-presence rule 
under the commerce clause, because ―in today‘s economy, physical presence 
frequently has very little to do with a transaction a State might seek to tax‖); 
see also Christina R. Edson, Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence and Tax 
Nexus Standards in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 893 
(1996) (state revenue agencies have been ―forced to apply outdated statutes 
and court decisions relating to archaic business methods when analyzing the 
taxation of companies that conduct business within a state but do not have the 
traditional ‗physical presence‘ within the state via property, employees, inven-
tory, and the like‖); Jerome R. Hellerstein, The Quill Case: What the States 
Can Do to Undo the Effects of the Decision, 58 ST. TAX NOTES 791 (1993); 
Charles Rothfield, Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 3 ST. TAX NOTES 
111 (1992); David F. Shores, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Quill, Al-
lied Signal and a Proposal, 72 NEB. L. REV. 682 (1993). 
 89. See, e.g., Jeptha Nafziger, Taxing Business-to-Consumer Interstate 
Remote Retail Sales: Economics v. Jurisprudence in the Battle Over Tax Juris-
diction, 16 J. PUB. AND INT‘L AFF. 122, 122 (2005) (―The continued and increas-
ing significance of nontaxed remote retail sales . . . has put the long-term sol-
vency of these tax bases and the public programs they fund in jeopardy.‖); 
John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus 
Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 355 (2003) (argu-
ing that, contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Quill, ―[c]ommon sense 
tells us that the volume of sales, or the percentage of total sales that a seller 
makes to customers within a state, or both, are the proper measures of the 
threshold‖); John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity 
Isolation or Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419, 473 (2002) (―[S]ales tax 
equity can be fully achieved only if Quill‘s anachronistic physical presence test 
is either judicially or legislatively overruled.‖); Academic Specialists Reject 
Advisory Commission Sales Tax Proposals, 2000 ST. TAX TODAY 80-30, at Doc. 
2000-11538 (Apr. 25, 2000) (arguing that the physical presence test from Quill 
should be overruled). 
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ther sanguine about the effects of its decision; it noted that 
Congress could, if it wished, prescribe a different rule.90 While 
various proposals have been floated in Congress,91 none has be-
come law. In the meantime, state courts have largely limited 
Quill to its facts with several holding that economic presence 
suffices for a state to tax the income of multistate businesses 
doing business in a state but lacking a physical presence 
there.92 Justice Kennedy‘s concurring opinion suggests that 
members of the Court, too, are beginning to weary of waiting 
for a legislative fix. 
Direct Marketing Association was the latest in a series of 
legal disputes over laws aimed at forcing Amazon to collect and 
remit sales and use taxes to states.93 In contrast to other states, 
Colorado‘s law simply required retailers whose Colorado gross 
sales exceeded $100,000 to notify Colorado purchasers of their 
obligation to pay sales and use taxes and send a report to Colo-
rado purchasers who bought more than $500 worth of goods 
from the retailer.94 The retailer then had to provide the state 
with a list of Colorado purchasers, including names and ad-
dresses, as well as how much they purchased.95 
The Direct Marketing Association sought to enjoin the law, 
claiming it violated the DCCD. A district court agreed;96 on ap-
 
 90. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 (―Congress is now free to decide whether, when, 
and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with 
a duty to collect use taxes.‖). 
 91. See, e.g., Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, S. 743, 113th Cong. 
(2013). The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 would have authorized states 
under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement to require remote sellers 
with annual gross receipts exceeding $1 million to collect and remit sales and 
use taxes if the state complies with the minimum simplification requirements 
relating to the administration of the tax. See also Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 
1832, 112th Cong. (2011). This 2011 bill would have authorized states to re-
quire remote sellers to collect and remit sales and use taxes if the state was a 
member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement or had simplified 
their sales and use tax administration requirements. 
 92. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm‘n, 437 S.E.2d 13 
(S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993) (upholding the imposition of a 
franchise tax on a non-resident taxpayer and concluding that Quill‘s physical 
presence requirement did not apply to other taxes). 
 93. Neal A. Koskella, Comment, The Enigma of Sales Taxation Through 
the Use of State or Federal “Amazon” Laws: Are We Getting Anywhere?, 49 
IDAHO L. REV. 121, 124 (2012) (examining the debate between supporters and 
critics of the constitutionality of ―Amazon laws‖). 
 94. Direct Mktg. Ass‘n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1128 (2015). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Direct Mktg. Ass‘n v. Huber, No. 10-cv-01546-REB-CBS (D. Colo. Jan. 
26, 2011), 2011 WL 250556 (granting preliminary injunction; finding likeli-
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peal, the Tenth Circuit held that the law violated the Tax In-
junction Act (TIA), which prohibits courts from ―enjoin[ing], 
suspend[ing], or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or collection 
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy may be had in the courts of such State.‖97 A unanimous 
Court held that the Colorado law did none of those things and 
was not barred by the TIA.98 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy signaled an 
openness to reconsidering Quill.99 Kennedy had joined Justice 
Scalia‘s concurring opinion in Quill, which justified the reten-
tion of the physical presence requirement on stare decisis 
grounds.100 Not only had times (and technology) changed, Ken-
nedy argued, he even suggested that Quill might have been 
wrong the day it was decided. He wrote that the Quill Court 
―should have taken the opportunity to reevaluate Bellas Hess 
not only in light of Complete Auto but also in view of the dra-
matic technological and social changes that had taken place in 
our increasingly interconnected economy.‖101 He continued:  
The Internet has caused far-reaching systemic and structural changes 
in the economy, and, indeed, in many other societal dimensions. Alt-
hough online businesses may not have a physical presence in some 
States, the Web has, in many ways, brought the average American 
closer to most major retailers. A connection to a shopper‘s favorite 
store is a click away—regardless of how close or far the nearest store-
front. Today buyers have almost instant access to most retailers via 
cell phones, tablets, and laptops. As a result, a business may be pre-
sent in a State in a meaningful way without that presence being 
physical in the traditional sense of the term.102  
―Given these changes in technology and consumer sophisti-
cation,‖ he concluded,  
 
hood of success on the merits of DCCD claim). 
 97. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
 98. Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1124. The Court did make clear that 
it took no position on whether the ―comity doctrine‖ barred the district court‘s 
injunction. Id. at 1133; see, e.g., Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. 560 U.S. 413, 
421 (2010) (describing the ―comity doctrine,‖ a discretionary judicial practice, 
which defers to the jurisdiction of another state and which centers on the be-
lief that other states' and the federal government should respect the sover-
eignty of the separate state governments in the interest of cooperation and 
uniformity). On remand, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado‘s notice 
and reporting requirements did not violate the DCCD. Direct Mktg. Ass‘n v. 
Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 99. See Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1135 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 100. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
Justice Thomas also joined Justice Scalia‘s opinion. See id. 
 101. Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134–35 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 1135 (citations omitted). 
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it is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court‘s hold-
ing in Quill. A case questionable even when decided, Quill now harms 
States to a degree far greater than could have been anticipated earli-
er. It should be left in place only if a powerful showing can be made 
that its rationale is still correct.103 
The Court would not lack for possible cases to take up, 
should three other justices share Justice Kennedy‘s skepticism 
about the continued desirability of retaining the physical pres-
ence standard. Some states, like Alabama and South Dakota, 
have recently issued regulations or passed ―economic nex-
us/factor presence‖ laws104 that all but beg online retailers lack-
ing a physical presence but doing substantial business in the 
state to sue them.105 
  TAKE FIVE: FIRST MARBLEHEAD CORP. V. 
COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE AND THE SCOPE OF 
WYNNE   
Though it didn‘t require that domiciliary states give credits 
for individual income taxes paid to source states as a matter of 
constitutional law, Wynne did hold that credits cured the lack 
of internal consistency. While long a feature of tax cases involv-
ing interstate corporations, Wynne‘s application of the principle 
to a case involving an individual income tax represented some-
thing of an extension of existing law. Most early commentators 
on Wynne, however, noted that its holding could create effects 
that ripple through other areas of state and local taxation.106  
Clues to Wynne‘s scope can perhaps be found in the Court‘s 
decision to grant certiorari in First Marblehead Corp. v. Com-
missioner,107 then immediately vacate and remand it to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for reconsideration in 
light of Wynne. While both cases involved the application of in-
 
 103. Id. (citations omitted). 
 104. The economic presence nexus standard issued by the Alabama De-
partment of Revenue, based on a pre-Quill nexus statute, ALA. CODE § 40-23-
68 (2016), provides that nonresident business entities doing business in Ala-
bama are deemed to have a substantial nexus with Alabama, and thus subject 
to income tax and business privilege tax filing obligations, if the entity's sales 
in the State exceed $250,000 annually. 
 105. Alan Collins, Governor Bentley Feeling Confident About Tax Plan Go-
ing into Special Session, WBRC FOX 6 NEWS, http://www.wbrc.com/story/ 
29682672/governor-bentley-feeling-confident-about-tax-plan-going-into 
-special-session (last updated Aug. 7, 2015). 
 106. See, e.g., Hellerstein, supra note 63, at 10; Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 
812–13. 
 107. 23 N.E.3d 892 (Mass. 2015), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded 136 
S. Ct. 317 (2015). 
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ternal consistency, First Marblehead involved not state rates of 
taxation but rather a state‘s statutory sourcing rules. 
First Marblehead Corporation was involved in issuing and 
securitizing student loans.108 One of its subsidiaries, Gate 
Holdings, held interests in a series of trusts that, in turn, held 
the securitized loans.109 The income from the trusts constituted 
―substantially all of Gate‘s gross income‖ during the tax years 
in question.110 Otherwise, ―Gate was essentially a holding com-
pany with no employees, payroll, tangible assets, or office 
space—either owned or leased.‖111 Its commercial domicile, 
however, was Massachusetts.112 
When computing Gate‘s income taxes for the 2004-2006 tax 
years, the state employed its three-factor apportionment formu-
la, which allocated to the state a percentage of Gate‘s income 
based on receipts, property, and payroll in Massachusetts, di-
vided by receipts, property, and payroll nationwide.113 For each 
taxable year, the state found that Gate‘s property factor was 
100% ―with the result that for each taxable year, fifty-one per-
cent of Gate‘s income was taxable in Massachusetts.‖114 Gate 
had no payroll either in Massachusetts or elsewhere. As a re-
sult, Gate owed an additional $4 million in taxes to the state.115 
On appeal, the issue was the state‘s allocation of 100% of 
the loans held by Gate to Massachusetts. Gate and First Mar-
blehead argued that Gate‘s Massachusetts property factor 
ought to be zero because none of the loans were held in the 
state.116 Under the state‘s source allocation statute, loans as-
signed other than to the taxpayer‘s ―regular place of business‖ 
would be assumed to have had the preponderance of substan-
tive contacts regarding the loan occur in Massachusetts.117 Be-
cause Gate had no regular place of business—it had no offices 
or employees—all substantive contacts regarding the loans 
were assumed to have taken place in Massachusetts, subject to 
 
 108. Id. at 896. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 897. 
 114. Id. Gate was found to derive 2% of its receipts from activities in Mas-
sachusetts. Id. at 897 n.14. 
 115. Id. at 897. 
 116. Id. at 900. 
 117. Id. 
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rebuttal.118 
Gate argued that because the loans were administered out-
side the state, that fact should serve to rebut the presumption 
that the loans should be allocated to Massachusetts. The appel-
late tax board, however, ruled that Gate ―had not proved the 
servicers were agents of the trusts . . . and that Gate had not 
offered any other legal basis for attributing the activities of the 
servicers to Gate.‖119 On appeal from that decision, however, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that agents or 
not, ―[the servicers‘] actions were not appropriately included 
within the concept of administration,‖ as defined by the stat-
ute.120 
Having disposed of Gate‘s remaining statutory arguments, 
the court then turned to its constitutional objections. In a con-
fusing and rather cursory analysis, the court concluded that the 
allocation of loans to Massachusetts was not internally incon-
sistent: 
[W]e have no reason to conclude that application of the apportion-
ment statute as we have interpreted it produces duplicative taxation 
of Gate‘s income, given that Gate‘s Massachusetts apportionment 
percentage for the tax year at issue was approximately fifty-one per 
cent, and the record reflects that Gate filed tax returns only in Mas-
sachusetts and Florida for the relevant years.121 
As commentators pointed out, though, that is not how in-
ternal consistency is determined. Note that the court did not 
assume that all fifty states had similar allocation statutes and 
then determine whether the risk of double taxation existed.122 
In a recent commentary on First Marblehead, Michael 
Knoll and Ruth Mason, proponents of the internal-consistency-
as-anti-discrimination-test view123 and authors of an amicus 
brief in Wynne that was apparently highly persuasive to the 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 903. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 906. 
 122. See, e.g., Knoll & Mason, supra note 69, at 924 (―Rather than hypo-
thetically assuming that all states used Massachusetts‘s apportionment rules, 
the Massachusetts court instead looked to see whether Gate experienced actu-
al double taxation. We assume that was why the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, vacated the court‘s opinion, and remanded the case for further consid-
eration.‖). 
 123. For a nice summary of their position, see Michael S. Knoll & Ruth 
Mason, Comptroller v. Wynne: Internal Consistency, a National Marketplace, 
and Limits on State Sovereignty to Tax, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 267 (2015).  
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majority,124 discussed how Wynne should apply when the Mas-
sachusetts high court reconsiders First Marblehead. They con-
cede that comparing sourcing rules is more difficult than com-
paring states‘ rate structures, but nevertheless argue that 
internal consistency ―provides a simple and powerful technique 
that courts can use to ascertain whether a state‘s tax laws are 
unconstitutional.‖125 
The court, they argue, ―should add (1) the portion of Gate‘s 
income Massachusetts would allocate to Massachusetts under 
the state‘s property allocation rule and (2) the portion of Gate‘s 
income other states would allocate to themselves using the 
challenged Massachusetts property allocation rules.‖126 If more 
than 100% of Gate‘s income is allocated, then the sourcing rules 
fail internal consistency. While they concede that they are ―un-
sure which way First Marblehead should come out on remand,‖ 
they conclude that ―Wynne and the internal consistency test 
provide the lower courts with clear direction.‖127 
What is more significant about First Marblehead, however, 
is that the Supreme Court did not treat Wynne as a one-off. 
Even though the subject was sourcing rules as opposed to tax 
rates, the Court‘s remand to the Massachusetts high court sig-
nals that it understands the rule in Wynne should be applied 
beyond Wynne‘s particular facts. As one state and local tax ex-
pert commented, First Marblehead was likely a shot across the 
bow of states and cities whose apportionment and tax base 
measurement structures have internal consistency problems; 
he predicted some quiet settlements in the wake of First Mar-
blehead and thought that the Court‘s treatment of the case 
might have a future deterrent effect as well.128 
 
 124. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802–04 (discussing and applying the analysis 
from the Knoll & Mason brief). 
 125. Knoll & Mason, supra note 69, at 925. 
 126. Id. at 926. 
 127. Id. at 926. ―What a court would need to know to apply the internal 
consistency test and ascertain whether the Massachusetts sourcing rules are 
constitutional as applied to Gate,‖ they explain, ―is how Massachusetts treats 
the nondomiciliary situation when Massachusetts non-domiciliaries hold loans 
that have connections with Massachusetts.‖ Id. at 927. 
 128. ‗First Marblehead‘ Reflects Broad Implications of ‗Wynne‘, BLOOM-
BERG BNA (Oct. 23, 2015) http://news.bna.com/dtln/display/batch_ 
print_display.adp (quoting Bruce P. Ely, chair of the state and local tax section 
at Bradley, Arant, Boult, Cummings, in Birmingham, Alabama).  
Denning_Final (1)  
124 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [100:103 
 
  CONCLUSION   
That the Wynnes prevailed on their DCCD claim is reason 
enough to take note of their case. Add to that, however, the 
Court‘s strong endorsement of internal consistency, the majori-
ty‘s characterization of internal consistency as a means for 
smoking out discrimination, the absence of both external con-
sistency and the Complete Auto framework, as well as Justice 
Kennedy‘s call for a reconsideration of Quill, and Wynne seems 
more like an inflection point in the Court‘s DCCD jurispru-
dence. While such points are often clear only in retrospect, the 
Court‘s actions in First Marblehead strongly suggest that 
Wynne was not to be confined to its facts. 
Wynne is also useful to illustrate a broader point: Constitu-
tional doctrine is not static.129 The process of creation, applica-
tion, and modification of rules to implement constitutional 
principles is just that—a process.130 Courts over time create 
and discard rules for any number of reasons: because old rules 
no longer fit the facts on the ground,131 because of changes in 
perceptions of risk,132 or because changes in other areas exert a 
kind of gravitational pull or exert hydraulic pressure on exist-
ing doctrines.  
Despite its now-canonical status, the Complete Auto ―test‖ 
became so only nunc pro tunc. In the case itself, Justice 
Blackmun merely mentioned a few things, the presence or ab-
sence of which might have called a state or local tax into ques-
tion.133 As Boris Bittker observed, ―[t]his list of the four claims 
that the taxpayer did not make in Complete Auto Transit was 
 
 129. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 110 (1991). 
 130. Denning & Kent, supra note 75, at 456–28.  
 131. See Roosevelt, supra note 75 (describing symptoms that suggest doc-
trinal rules no longer adequately serve to implement constitutional principles); 
Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 145 (arguing that changes in perceptions of facts impact justices‘ choice 
of decision rules and affect shape of constitutional doctrine generally). 
 132. See Denning & Kent, supra note 75 (arguing that constitutional doc-
trine reflects justices‘ perception of risk to constitutional principles and ade-
quacy of existing political safeguards to address those risks). 
 133. See Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Justice 
Blackmun wrote: 
We note . . . that no claim is made that the activity is not sufficiently 
connected to the State to justify a tax, or that the tax is not fairly re-
lated to benefits provided the taxpayer, or that the tax discriminates 
against interstate commerce, or that the tax is not fairly apportioned. 
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promptly transformed into a ‗test,‘ although it was not given 
this title at birth.‖134 Nor were those factors new ones; most 
could be found in earlier opinions.135 Moreover, one of the four 
factors—whether the tax is fairly related to the benefits provid-
ed by the taxing jurisdiction—has subsequently never done any 
appreciable work. Well before Wynne, commentators had sug-
gested that ―several of [Complete Auto‘s] parts are functionally 
redundant.‖136 It should therefore be no surprise—and no occa-
sion for distress—if the Court has decided, nearly forty years 
on, that a different, perhaps better set of tools is required to 
implement the principles served by the DCCD. 
 
 134. DENNING, supra note 8, at § 8.10, 8-41. 
 135. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 
48 (1940) (articulating the anti-discrimination principle); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. 
v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (striking down unapportioned gross re-
ceipts tax imposed on domestic corporation that exposed ―interstate commerce 
. . . to the risk of a double taxation‖); W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Rev., 303 U.S. 
250, 260 (1938) (observing that the Commerce Clause prohibits the imposition 
of multiple tax burdens on interstate commerce). 
 136. Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause: The Object-Measure Approach, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 193. 
